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Abstract The landscape for entrepreneurial finance has
changed strongly over the last years. Many new players
have entered the arena. This editorial introduces and
describes the new players and compares them along
the four dimensions: debt or equity, investment goal,
investment approach, and investment target. Following
this, we discuss the factors explaining the emergence of
the new players and group them into supply- and
demand-side factors. The editorial gives researchers
and practitioners orientation about recent developments
in entrepreneurial finance and provides avenues for
relevant and fruitful further research.
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1 Introduction
Young innovative firms play a key role in modern
knowledge-based economies because they are an impor-
tant source of new jobs, radical innovations, and produc-
tivity growth, as well as a disciplining device for the
behavior of established firms (Block et al. 2016). Unfor-
tunately, these firms often suffer from financing con-
straints, which limit their growth and threaten their sur-
vival (Brown and Earle 2015; Carpenter and Petersen
2002; Cosh et al. 2009). A wide literature has addressed
the theme of financial constraints for young innovative
firms. Lack of internal cash flows and collaterals, as well
as asymmetric information and agency problems, are the
main reasons for the difficulties in raising external
funding (see Hall and Lerner (2010) for a summary of
the literature). The entrepreneurial finance literature ad-
dresses these problems and investigates ways how young
innovative firms can access capital for financing growth,
innovation, and internationalization.
The landscape for entrepreneurial finance, however,
has changed over the last years.1 Many new players
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such as crowdfunding, accelerators, and family offices
have entered the arena, and several new entrepreneurial
financing instruments such as peer-to-peer business
lending and equity-like mezzanine financing have been
introduced. These new players and instruments have
emerged, among others, because of the difficulties faced
by entrepreneurs and early-stage new ventures in raising
funds, especially in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial
crisis. Other reasons comprise increased technological
opportunities, changed requirements in firms’ product
markets, globalization, and regulatory changes. More-
over, the difficulties firms encounter in raising seed and
start-up capital play an increasingly important role in the
policy agenda of local, national, and international gov-
ernmental institutions, as is documented by the mea-
sures included in the Horizon 2020 and COSME pro-
jects funded by the European Commission.
In less than a decade, these new players and instru-
ments have spread across developed and emerging
countries, helping many innovative businesses in raising
capital. In addition to that, governments around the
world are increasingly considering these new players
and instruments as fundamental mechanisms to alleviate
the financing difficulties of entrepreneurial firms. De-
spite this rapid growth, however, the academic literature
on most of the recent trends in entrepreneurial finance is
still in its infancy; hence, there is ample room for further
inquiring and a high need for the special issue Bnew
trends in entrepreneurial finance^ from both a practical
and theoretical perspective.
This editorial to the special issue compares the new
players along the four dimensions (1) debt or equity, (2)
investment goal, (3) investment approach, and (4) invest-
ment target. Following this introduction and comparison
of new players, we discuss the underlying factors or
reasons explaining their emergence. We group these fac-
tors or reasons into demand-side and supply-side factors.
After the comparison of the new players and the discus-
sion of the factors or reasons behind their emergence, the
editorial provides a brief overview of the content of the
special issue and introduces the 10 articles included in the
special issue. When possible, we establish a link between
the respective article and our overview of new players.
The editorial has the goal to give researchers in the area of
entrepreneurial finance orientation about recent develop-
ments and thereby provide avenues for relevant and
fruitful further research.
The remainder of the editorial is divided into four
sections. Section 2 introduces and compares the new
players in entrepreneurial finance, Section 3 discusses
the underlying trends, Section 4 summarizes the special
issue papers, while Section 5 concludes and discusses
relevant areas for further research.
2 An overview and comparison of new players
in entrepreneurial finance
Venture capital (VC) and business angel (BA) financing
have traditionally been advocated as important sources
of financing for young innovative firms that find it
difficult to access bank or debt finance. However, the
market and landscape for entrepreneurial finance has
changed over the last years. Several new players have
emerged, and there has been an increasing presence of
other players that have traditionally not had a major role
in the market. These players are very heterogeneous and
include players as diverse as family offices, the crowd,
and venture debt funds. Some of these new players
value not only financial goals but are also interested in
non-financial goals. These non-financial goals comprise
social goals in case of social venture funds, strategic and
technological goals in case of corporate venture capital
(CVC) firms, political goals in case of government-
sponsored funds, and product-or iented and
community-building goals in case of reward-based
crowdfunding.
The new players have not only brought a variety
of new investment goals but have also introduced
new investment approaches, valuation methods or
measures, and business models of entrepreneurial
financing. As, for example, non-financial goals have
become more important, new valuation models or
measures have been developed taking into account
non-financial goals in the selection of investment
targets. Consider, for example, the social return on
investment (SROI) measure, which aims to deter-
mine the (social) impact of social ventures. For
many of the new players, value creation is not only
limited to provide financing to promising firms but
also includes the provision of value added services,
such as management and technological support, and
more generally the provision of advice, as well as
network access. These active, hands-on investment
approaches are not only limited to VC firms and
BAs, who were always following this approach,
but are also used by some of the new players such
as incubators and accelerators, university-managed
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funds, and sometimes even backers of reward-based
crowdfunding campaigns.
Next to the emergence of the new players, the
whole environment of entrepreneurial finance has
changed. The median pre-money valuation of young
companies is rising into new historical heights, es-
pecially in later-stage financing. This can be seen by
an ever increasing club of unicorns (private compa-
nies valued >1bn US $). This has created rumors of
a tech-bubble, as many of these companies are un-
profitable or do not have created a sustainable
revenue-model for their business. High valuations
can also put pressure to founders, as they need to
deliver on these expectations. The question is what
drives these high valuations and what are the risks
associated with them. Many start-ups (especially in
the USA) have significant cash-burn rates or are
unprofitable. Often, this leads their founders to
search for new capital very shortly after their last
round of financing. As some exit channels are very
difficult to reach (e.g., IPO), the current investors
can find themselves in a Block-in^ situation of either
providing their start-ups additional capital or risking
a bankruptcy.
Overall, the emergence of the new players and
their variety of investment goals and investment
approaches has made entrepreneurial financing a
complex and difficult process. Table 1 provides
an overview of the new players and compares
them along the four dimensions (1) debt or equi-
ty, (2) investment goal, (3) investment approach,
and (4) investment target.
Accelerators (and incubators) are organizations
that aim to help start-ups with mentorship, ad-
vice, network access, and shared resources to
grow and become successful (Hallen et al.
2016). Sometimes they also offer physical space
and financial resources, which often comes in the
form of equity. There exist different types of
accelerators and incubators, depending on the ser-
vices offered, the industry focus, and the owner,
which could be a private company or a govern-
mental institution.
Angel networks are networks of BAs who invest
together in early-stage high growth ventures (see e.g.,
Croce et al. (2016) for a recent review). They provide
equity and offer management support and network ac-
cess. As a group, they can provide higher amounts of
financing than individual BA investors.
Crowdfunding is an umbrella term used to describe
diverse forms of fundraising, typically via the Inter-
net, whereby groups of people pool money to sup-
port a particular goal (Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz and
Block 2014)There are four main types of
crowdfunding, namely reward-based, donation-
based, lending-based, and investment-based (equity)
crowdfunding. First, in reward-based crowdfunding
project, proponents look for finance from a crowd of
backers. The most typical reward to backers is the
delivery of a (sometime customized) product or ser-
vice, which makes this type of crowdfunding some-
how similar to financial bootstrapping (i.e.,
crowdfunders are financed by advance payments that
most backers give in exchange for the subsequent
delivery of a product or service). Backers may also
be offered Bego-boosting^ rewards, such as a name
plaque, or Bcommunity-belonging^ rewards, such as
the invitations in social events (e.g., the launch party
of the project) or the offering of symbolic objects
that display support for a project. Project proponents
are either individuals or companies. The average
amount of finance in a successful campaign is rather
limited (in Kickstarter or Indiegogo, the most suc-
cessful reward-based crowdfunding platforms,
around 30 to 40,000 US $), and on average, one
project out of three is successful. Previous studies
clearly show that the ability of project proponents to
mobilize their social capital, within (Colombo et al.
2015) and outside (Mollick, 2013) the crowdfunding
platform, plays a key role for the success of a cam-
paign. Second, proponents in donation-based
crowdfunding are individuals or non-governmental
organizations raising money for a cause. They typi-
cally aim to raise as much as possible and the size of
the campaign varies from few hundred euros to mil-
lions. Motivation to donate includes charitable giv-
ing and social image. Third, lending-based
crowdfunding is by far the type of crowdfunding with
the largest total raised amount.2 It takes a variety of
different forms, ranging from peer-to-peer lending (see
e.g. Lin et al. 2013) to invoice crowdfunding. Motiva-
tions for the crowd to invest are mainly financial as
lenders receive fixed interest rates for their loans. Lastly,
central to entrepreneurial finance is the fourth type of
2 For example, in 2015, 3.2 billion euro of debt was raised from the
crowd by more than 200,000 projects in the European Union (see
European Commission 2016).
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crowdfunding, equity-based crowdfunding. Equity
crowdfunding is a form of financing in which entrepre-
neurs make an open call to sell a specified amount of
equity or bond-like shares in a company on the Internet.
The open call and investments take place on an online
platform that provides the means for the transactions.
The average size of campaigns in the UK platforms
Crowdcube and Seedrs is about 250 thousand pounds
(Vismara 2016). The motivation to invest is to realize a
financial return. Vismara (2016) finds indeed that
Table 1 An overview and comparison of new players in entrepreneurial finance
New player Debt or equity Investment goal Investment approach Investment target
Active or
passive
Non-financial
support
Accelerators (and
incubators)
Depends on type of
accelerator/ in-
cubator
Financial, strategic, political
(depends on type of
accelerator/incubator)
Active Management
support, training,
network access
Early stage start-up
Angel networks Equity Financial Active Management
support, network
access
Early stage start-up
Crowd
- Debt-based Debt Financial Passive None Early stage start-up or
project
- Donation-based – Social Passive None Social venture or
project
- Reward-based – Product-related Passive,
Some-
times
active
Sometimes product
testing
Early stage start-up or
project
- Equity-based Equity Financial Passive None Early stage start-up or
project
Corporate venture
capital (CVC)
Equity Financial, technological, and
strategic
Active Management
support,
technology
support
Early and later stage
start-up
Family offices Equity Financial Mostly
passive
Little Later stage start-up
Governmental
venture capital
(GVC)
Debt or equity Financial and governmental Mostly
passive
Little Early and later stage
start-up
IP-based investment
funds
– Financial Passive None Patents
IP-backed debt
funding
Debt Financial Passive IP-based start-ups and
established mid-
sized firms
Mini-bonds Debt Financial Passive Established mid-sized
firms
Social venture funds
or social venture
capital
Debt and equity Financial and social Active Management
support, network
access
Social ventures
University-managed
or university-
based funds
Mostly equity Financial and university-related Active Management
support, network
access
Academic and student
start-ups
Venture debt lenders
or funds
Debt Financial Passive None Later stage start-up
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offering rewards to investors does not increase the prob-
ability of success of equity crowdfunding campaigns.
Relatedly, in a survey of investors in this type of
crowdfunding, Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) find that
non-financial motives play no significant role in their
investment decisions.
Corporate venture capital (CVC) refers to invest-
ments by large, established firms into start-ups or
growth firms. Instead of acquiring ventures and integrat-
ing them into their own organization, large incumbents
like Intel, Google, or Johnson& Johnson take a minority
stake in innovative young firms, which remain indepen-
dent, and help them further develop their promising
technologies and markets. CVC investors provide equi-
ty and next to financial returns are also interested in
strategic goals such as access to new technology and/or
new markets or customer segments. CVC investors tend
to be more patient investors than independent VC in-
vestors (IVC), and often syndicate with these latter, even
if the impact of syndicated deals on the performance of
investee companies (as measured e.g., by time to IPO or
increase in total factor productivity, see Colombo and
Murtinu 2016) seem to be less positive than
those of stand-alone deals. CVC investors have been
shown to invest either in later or earlier stage ventures,
with their inclination to early stage deals depending on
the institutional characteristics of the entrepreneurial
finance ecosystem in different countries. In particular,
Katila et al. (2008) show that in the USA, new ventures
prefer to postpone the formation of CVC ties to later
stages, so as to better protect their technology. Accord-
ingly, CVC investors often invest in later rounds in
companies backed by independent VC investors. Con-
versely, in their replication study, Colombo and Shafi
(2016) highlight that the pattern of CVC investments in
the European Union is different: the likelihood of the
formation of early stage CVC ties is much higher, as a
result of the institutional peculiarities of the European
VCmarket in Europe. CVC has been around since many
years (Alvarez-Garrido and Dushnitsky 2016). This
form of financing is highly volatile, ranging from 6 to
23% of the European VCmarket in the years from 2007
to 2015 (see European Venture Capital Association
(EVCA) Annual Reports). Some organizations invest
in VC due to an increasing fear of being disrupted by
innovative start-ups. However, CVCs are less autono-
mous relative to limited partnership VCs, and this lack
of autono-my has led to programs being scaled back and
canceled among some organizations at different points
in time when strategic objectives or staff change. Fur-
ther, there are compensation differentials across CVCs
and limited partnership VCs, which can exacerbate the
instability of CVCs.
Families owning large firms increasingly install
family offices as intermediaries to manage their
wealth (Zellweger and Kammerlander 2015). Thus,
instead of owning the firm directly, the family bun-
dles its ownership shares into a family office and
only has an indirect ownership share in the firm.
This way, conflicts within the group of family
owners can be reduced, a professional wealth man-
agement is introduced, and flexibility is increased
both for the firm and the family. Such family offices
increasingly also invest in growth ventures and have
evolved into an important player in the market for
entrepreneurial finance. The EVCA estimates their
share in the market for the financing of growth
ventures to be about 1–5% over the years from
2007 to 2015. Family offices usually provide equity,
have primarily financial goals, and are considered
long-term investors.
Many governments have set up programs that seek to
foster VC financing, through the establishment of Gov-
ernmental Venture Capital (GVC) funds, with the aim to
alleviate the financial gap problem as well as at the same
time to pursue investments that will yield social payoffs
and positive externalities to the society. Governments
may have various intentions and objectives when setting
up these funds. To the extent that these governmental
objectives differ, there is heterogeneity in the types of
firms that the GVCs invest, in the effort that they devote
to their investee firms, and, ultimately, in the efficacy of
their investments (Colombo et al. 2016). The success of
a GVC program also depends on the institutional envi-
ronment in which it operates, which is typically poor in
less developed areas. This result is in line with the idea
that there need to be a good match between Bsmart
money^ and Bsmart places^. This affects primarily the
performance of GVCs aimed at regional development
and localized job creation rather than those that support
the development of young high-tech industries. The
effectiveness of GVC programs depends largely on their
design and aims. With regard to direct public interven-
tion, there is heterogeneity in the type of allocation of
governmental funds to GVCs. Allocation types can be
classified into three categories: direct public funds, hy-
brid private-public funds, and funds-of-funds. Direct
public funds include investments through government-
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supported VC-like schemes, often with the aim of facil-
itating the development of a VC industry within a region
or industry. Due to problems related to a lack of skills or
crowding-out issues, some of these programs have been
modified to include co-investments with private inves-
tors. Scholarly evidence indicates that this is a sound
decision. For example, Bertoni and Tykvova (2015)
document a very positive innovation impact of GVC
investments in European pharma and biotech start-ups,
but only when the GVC investor enters a syndicate led
by a private investor. When GVC investors invest on a
stand-alone basis, this positive effect vanishes. Lastly,
government support can take the form of funds-of-
funds, which invest in other investment funds rather
than investing directly into companies, with the Euro-
pean Investment Fund being a notable example.
IP-based investment funds invest into intellectual
property (IP), mostly patents (Gredel et al. 2012). This
way, innovative firms or investors can monetarize their
IP and use the funds generated to grow their venture.
Thus, IP-based investment funds neither provide equity
nor debt, but acquire intellectual assets of a company.
IP-backed debt funding allows firms to exploit the
economic value of their IP to obtain loans from banks or
other financial institutions (Fischer and Ringler 2014).
IP rights can indeed be exploited as a source of capital
collateralized by the stream of revenues deriving from
licensing or royalty agreements, which typically involve
portfolios of copyrights or patents. Although these in-
struments involve high structuring costs, they can be an
important component in the funding processes of inno-
vative start-ups.
Mini-bonds are public bonds issued in special SME
bond segments (Mietzner et al. 2017). They were used
as a financing instrument by SMEs or BMittelstand^-
firms in the aftermath of the financial crisis where banks
were either unwilling or unable to provide debt financ-
ing. Mini-bonds reflect also the desire by firms to de-
crease their dependence on bank financing.
Social venture capital funds provide seed-funding to
for-profit social enterprise. The funding can come in both
debt and equity, and the goal is to achieve a reasonable
financial return while also delivering social impact. The
latter is what it distinguishes from traditional venture
capital financing focusing on simple financial return.
University-managed or university-based funds have
recently been launched, mainly to support ideas from
university faculty, staff, and alumni. As far as
early-stage technology developed in labs is not close
to the market, universities need to fund research inter-
nally. These funds are important for getting the technol-
ogy ready to hand it over to a development partner from
the private sector.
Venture debt lenders or funds are specialized finan-
cial institutions at the intersection of venture capital and
traditional debt. They provide loans to start-ups, but
unlike traditional bank, financing do not require securi-
ties or positive cash flows from start-ups. De
Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) estimate the size of
the US venture debt market at about $3 billion per year.
Internationally, there is little relation between institu-
tional factors such as legal conditions and venture debt
returns (Cumming and Fleming 2013; Cumming et al.
2016). However, returns to venture debt funds are close-
ly related to firm-specific proxies for borrower risk
(Cumming and Fleming 2013). Also, returns are signif-
icantly affected by market conditions such as the VIX
index, and whether or not the debt issue is a primary or
secondary issuance (Cumming et al. 2016).
3 Factors explaining the emergence of new players
Following the introduction of the new players in entre-
preneurial financing, we now try to understand the
underlying factors that lead to their emergence. We
distinguish between supply-side and demand-side
factors.
3.1 Supply-side factors
3.1.1 Economic and financial crisis related factors
Supply-side factors refer to the supply side of entrepre-
neurial financing and comprise various types of factors,
some of which can be linked to the 2008/2009 financial
crisis and the economic crisis that followed. As a reac-
tion to the financial crisis, the regulation of financial
institutions has intensified with a strong focus on banks.
Examples of these regulations include Basel II and III,
which increase the minimum capital requirements that a
bank has to hold dependent on the riskiness of the loans
it has given out. To comply with these intensified regu-
lations, banks had to introduce various risk measures
that make small firm financing more complex and ex-
pensive. As a result, start-ups and small firms with
uncertain and risky business models have little chances
to obtain bank financing for their ventures.
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The financial crisis was followed by a severe eco-
nomic crisis in several EU member states and the USA.
As a reaction to the economic crisis, the central banks
cut interest rates to stimulate economic activity. The low
interest rates made debt financing relatively cheap com-
pared to other sources of entrepreneurial financing, pro-
vided that the venture’s business model is low risk and
that is has enough track record and securities to comply
with the intensified risk measures introduced by the
banks (see previous paragraph).
The low interest rates also had an effect on investors.
They made investments in government and corporate
bonds less attractive and have led investors to seek other
investment opportunities. This has benefitted, among
others, venture capital funds, incubators or
crowdfunding providers in their fund raising efforts.
This, in turn, increased the chances for innovative,
high-risk ventures to receive risk capital.
The tough economic climate and the negative expe-
riences with the dotcom bubble in the year 2000 have
led to a decrease in initial public offerings (IPOs). Con-
sider, for example, Germany, where the BNeuer Markt^
(the stock market segment for high tech and innovative
ventures) closed down in 2001 (Vismara et al. 2012).
This collapse along with the negative experiences made
by investors has brought the market for IPOs down and
created difficulties for risk or venture capital providers
to exit their investments. The reduced exit possibilities
make it more difficult for risk capital providers like VC
funds to collect funds and invest them into start-ups
(Block and Sandner 2009).
3.1.2 Regulation-related factors
In general, it is well established that countries with
stronger regulations enable entrepreneurship and entre-
preneurial finance, as regulation can lower the cost of
entry and ensure contractual certainty. However, in
some cases, the comparative dearth of regulatory en-
forcement can also positively affect the presence of
start-ups. For example, the absence of enforcement of
banking regulations has enabled a comparative growth
of financial technology (FinTech) start-ups in countries
without a major financial center (Cumming and
Schwienbacher 2016).
Partially, due to increased regulation on traditional
stock markets, off-exchange transactions have been
attracting increasingly larger trading volumes. Initially,
dark (or blind) pools emerged informally in formal stock
exchanges, which would take large buy and sell orders
in certain shares and match them, after the close of
trading. Later, investment banks and independent oper-
ators, such as Liquidnet, started matching orders inter-
nally, avoiding transaction fees to stock exchanges.
New exchange platforms that trade pre-IPO
shares (or, in general, shares of private firms), such
as SecondMarket, the main platform for trading pre-
IPO shares of Facebook, or SharesPost, provide
alternative venues to investors and employees for
cashing out. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act (JOBS Act) in the USA clarified several legal
uncertainties regarding the operation of these sec-
ondary markets that have reduced the benefits of
going public in traditional stock exchanges. Further-
more, Title III of the JOBS Act and the additional
rules provided by the Securities and Exchange Com-
miss ion (SEC) c la r i fy the cond i t ions fo r
crowdfunding platforms offering securities. Whether
secondary markets and crowdfunding platforms will
be successful ultimately depends on their ability to
avoid listing Blemons^ on their markets.
Traditional stock markets now offer cheaper pos-
sibilities to raise public equity capital. For instance,
a large portion of the IPOs on the Toronto second
market are accounted for by Capital Pool Companies
(CPCs), which are a specialized form of Bblind
pool^ offering (Pandes and Robinson 2014). Meoli
et al. (2016) find that firms that graduate from the
second to the main market in Toronto outperform
VC-backed IPOs by 28.2 percentage points in the
3 years following the listing. Carpentier et al. (2012)
document that reverse mergers provide less disclo-
sure to investors than IPOs, suffer from a higher
degree of information asymmetry between the firm
and its investors, and have poor performance com-
pared with regular IPOs.
3.1.3 Technology-related factors
Technology has enabled the emergence of some new
players. Consider, for example, the case of reward-
based crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending, or in-
voice crowdfunding platforms. These players or fi-
nancing instruments were only made available by
technologies such as the Internet and new ways of
communication via social media. As a separate but
related matter, FinTech start-ups are currently rais-
ing large sums of money, which might have a
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tremendous influence on entrepreneurial finance.
Virtual currencies like Bitcoin and their associated
technologies (notably distributed ledgers based on
blockchain) can change the business models of
existing players in entrepreneurial finance and push
the new players even further. These technologies
provide new ways to assess risk and treat financial
information, allow for easier participation of non-
professional investors in entrepreneurial financing,
provide greater liquidity, and reduce monitoring
costs of investors, but can also lead to higher con-
tagion risk due to greater connectedness through
securitization.
3.1.4 Policy-related factors
The creation of functioning markets of entrepreneur-
ial finance has become a priority for many govern-
ments around the world and has led to many policy
initiatives. The JOBS act in the USA changed a
number of laws and regulations making it easier
for small firms to conduct an IPO or to collect funds
through crowdfunding. Many governments installed
GVC funds to complement the market for private
VC funding (Leleux and Surlemount 2013 ), which
is underdeveloped in many countries outside the
USA. Another area of start-up policy concerns sub-
sidized debt financing via state-owned banks and
loan guarantee schemes or state subsidies for start-
ups and high-growth firms. Such policy initiatives
reduce either the costs of a particular financing
instrument or provide direct funding to new ventures
through state subsidies.
3.2 Demand-side factors
Next to supply-side factors, there also exist demand-
side factors related to the demands of start-ups,
founders, and the business models and markets in
which they operate.
3.2.1 Product market-related factors
The rise of the Internet and social media as well as
the globalization of product markets, have created
many so-called Bwinner-take-all markets.^ Such
markets are characterized by strong network exter-
nalities and lead to market situations where only a
few firms survive. Consider, for example, Facebook
or Google as examples of firms operating in highly
concentrated and quasi-monopolistic winner-take-all
markets. Start-ups in such markets with business
models building on network externalities need to
grow fast in order to establish standards and create
lock-in situations for customers. This, however,
drives up cash-burn rates and the amount of funding
needed in early stages of the venture cycle.
The high importance of network externalities in-
creases the value of social networks. Entrepreneurial
finance institutions such as venture capital firms or
business angels, which can provide network access,
gain in importance and can offer start-ups important
non-financial resources next to funding. In winner-
take-all markets, it is important to be fast and en-
gage with the customer at an early stage. Some
forms of c rowdfunding l ike reward-based
crowdfunding allow for such early customer contact.
It is also a way to test a product with customers and
enable a form of customer co-creation. Insofar,
crowdfunding reflects a general trend toward more
open and flexible innovation processes.
Incumbents and established firms fear being
disrupted through innovative technologies and
start-ups. That is why they are more open to coop-
erate and invest in start-ups via instruments such as
corporate venture capital and corporate incubators.
This, in turn, also has an influence on the supply of
entrepreneurial finance (see Section 3.1) and in-
creases the possibilities for innovative start-ups to
obtain financing.
Another product market-related factor is the
growth of the knowledge economy together with a
high importance of IP such as patents, trademarks,
and design rights. As firms tend to patent more, IP-
based financing instruments such as patent-based
investment funds become available and can be an
option for IP-based start-ups and growth ventures to
fund their operations. Moreover, patents can be used
as collateral to obtain debt funding from banks and
other financial institutions (Fischer and Ringler
2014).
3.2.2 Disintermediation
Financial intermediation has been a subject of con-
siderable study in the finance literature. On the one
hand, financial intermediaries are meant to reduce
information problems and help to meet demand and
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supply of capital; on the other hand, their activity is
obviously costly and may introduce agency con-
flicts. Financial innovation and disintermediation
may have the potential to countervail some aspects
of sub-optimal principal-agent problems in conven-
tional financial intermediation. More broadly, the
value of intermediation is now questioned as inno-
vations allow to by-pass intermediaries so that the
participants at the end of the supply and demand
chain (i.e., savers/investors and borrowers/fund
raisers) meet directly. For instance, the development
of online platforms has created new opportunities
for entrepreneurs to raise seed capital and for non-
professional investors to disintermediate their in-
vestments. By easing the manner in which demand
for capital meets supply, recent financial innovations
are expected to improve the efficiency of financial
markets. This encourages direct consumer interfaces
and evaluation and seems to tease the consumer into
a sense of empowerment or Balternativeness.^ This
affects both equity, with a shift from official stock
exchanges to crowdfunding, and debt, from tradi-
tional banks to peer-to-peer lending and shadow
banking. As noted by the Financial Stability Board
(FSB 2015), intermediating credit through non-bank
channels can have important advantages and con-
tributes to the financing of the real economy, but
such channels can also become a source of systemic
risk, especially when they are structured to perform
bank-like functions and when their interconnected-
ness with the regular banking system is strong.
4 The papers in this special issue
The goal of the special issue is to increase our under-
standing of recent trends in entrepreneurial finance. It
has a strong focus on crowdfunding (5 out of 10 papers),
which is a result of a recent explosion of empirical
research in this area. Next to crowdfunding, the special
issue contains papers about IPOs, BAs, GVCs, mini-
bonds, and participative loans. We will now briefly
introduce the main content of the special issue papers
and create a link to our discussion of new players and
instruments.
First, half of the papers in this special issue study
crowdfunding. The theoretical paper by Hornuf and
Schwienbacher (2017) is about regulation and equity
crowdfunding. In contrast to the traditional Blaw and
finance^ view that stronger investor protection is
better, they argue that too strong investor protection
may harm the development of equity crowdfunding
markets. Coherently, in many jurisdictions, securi-
ties regulation offers exemptions to prospectus and
registration requirements. The paper shows that the
optimal regulation depends on the availability of
alternative early-stage financing such as venture
capital and angel finance. Polzin et al. (2017) use
survey data from the Netherlands to distinguish be-
tween in-crowd and out-crowd funders in order to
test for heterogeneity in their information use. This
paper shows that in-crowd investors rely more on
information about the project creator than out-crowd
investors. Out-crowd investors do not seem to attach
more importance to information about the project
itself than in-crowd investors. Mohammadi and
Shafi (2017) introduce the gender issue in entrepre-
neurial finance. They investigate whether there are
gender-related differences in the behavior of
crowdfunding investors in Sweden. They find that
female investors are less likely to bid in campaigns
from younger teams and in high-tech projects, con-
sistent with a greater risk-aversion of female versus
male investors. The geographical aspects of
crowdfunding are studied by Guenther et al. (2017)
and by Giudici et al. (2017). The former presents
evidence of the influence of geographic distance
among home country retail, accredited, and
overseas investors and venture location in an
equity crowdfunding context. Geographic distance
is indeed negatively correlated with investment
probability for all home country investors, while
overseas investors are not sensitive to distance.
Giudici et al. (2017) find that the success of
crowdfunding projects closely depends on the char-
acteristics of the geographical area where project
proponents are located, which creates a local basin
of potential backers. Accordingly, they document
that the altruism of people residing in the area con-
tributes to an increased likelihood of success of
reward-based campaigns in Italy. The strength of
this effect depends on the level of social capital in
the area.
Three manuscripts of the special issue focus on
the provision of external equity finance to entrepre-
neurial firms. Takahashi (2017) examines affiliation
ties and underwriter selection in Japanese IPOs. He
finds that the presence of board members in the IPO-
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firms who have worked at a specific bank or its
parent company increases the probability of choos-
ing the bank as the lead underwriter. This effect is
economica l ly l a rge r than tha t o f l end ing
relationships and remains even if the issuer has no
lending and shareholding relationships with the
underwriter. Levratto et al. (2017) studies the impact
of business angel financing on the performance of
firms. They are able to do so by using a dataset of
French angel-backed companies, which are com-
pared to two control groups, one randomly selected
and another one consisting of similar enterprises.
They only found a positive influence of BAs on
the performance of firms when using the random
sample as a comparison group. Standaert and
Manigart (2017) focus their attention on the effect
of GVC financing on employment in portfolio com-
panies. Using a sample of companies that benefited
from the ARKimedes fund-of-fund in Flanders, they
find that companies backed by hybrid independent
VC funds show greater employment growth than
those backed by hybrid captive or hybrid GVC
funds. The financial objectives of hybrid indepen-
dent VC funds are therefore compatible with the
government’s objective of employment growth.
The last two papers in this special issue deal with
debt. Mietzner et al. (2017) is one of very few studies on
mini-bonds. Using a German dataset in the period from
2010 to 2015, they show that rating agencies can create
rating inflation by issuing overly favorable ratings. This
creates an opportunity for lower-quality firms to com-
pete for funding. In this environment, high-quality firms
have an incentive to use mini-bond underpricing to
signal their quality. Martí and Quas (2017) prove the
effectiveness of a recent form of government support in
Spain, called participative loan, in improving recipient
SMEs’ access to external financial debt. The positive
effect of this program is stronger for smaller firms, or for
those operating in high-technology sectors, which suffer
more acutely from information asymmetries, and negli-
gible for firms that already received support from other
government-supported institutions.
5 Conclusion and avenues for future research
To summarize, the markets for entrepreneurial fi-
nance have changed rapidly over the last years.
Many new players have entered the arena. Scholarly
research in entrepreneurial financing appears biased
toward certain players and financing instruments
such as VC and, more recently, crowdfunding and
has neglected others. Examples of neglected new
players in entrepreneurial financing are debt venture
funds, angel networks, and family offices.
Another neglected area in entrepreneurial finance
research is the interplay or interaction between the
new players or instruments and the established
forms of entrepreneurial financing such as VC or
BA financing. Start-ups seeking financing often
use several financing instruments simultaneously
(Moritz et al. 2016). Most existing entrepreneurial
finance research focuses on single financing instru-
ments such as VC or bank financing and does not
take a holistic approach where financing instruments
are regarded as complements rather than substitutes.
For example, it would be intriguing to understand
how a new form of financing such as crowdfunding
can be used simultaneously with established forms
of venture financing such as bank financing or VC.
Indeed, there is evidence of growing interest of VCs
and BAs in relying on the Bwisdom of the crowd^
and using crowdfunding campaigns as a testbed for
the companies they back (Colombo and Shafi 2017).
Research about financing instruments also misses a
longitudinal perspective. We know little how using
one instrument influences the likelihood to obtain
another instrument later on. It is important to under-
stand path dependencies in the process of entrepre-
neurial financing, e.g., whether VC funding can
follow crowdfunding or the other way around.3
From a practical perspective, we lack information
about whether the new players and their financing
instruments are reducing the early stage funding gap
in the financing of innovative ventures or whether
they merely replace or crowd out existing later-stage
financing instruments. A financing gap exists with
new technologies that have not proven their commer-
cial applications or usefulness. We do not know much
whether and to what degree the new players and their
financing instruments help to close this gap.
3 From this perspective, Guerini and Quas (2016) is an interesting
exception. Their longitudinal analysis of the interaction of GVC and
private VC investments documents that GVC-backed companies are
far more likely to attract private VC investments than comparable non-
VC-backed companies.
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